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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to study the optimal strategy a group of net buyers of emission permits 
(for instance the EU) under a future international climate agreement, i.e. a follow-up agreement to the 
Kyoto Protocol. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was signed during the third Conference of the Parties 
(CoP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 39 signatories of 
the Protocol, listed in the so-called Annex-B, and representing about two thirds of global emissions in 
1990, promised to reduce their emissions of six greenhouse gasses by 5.2 percent compared to 1990 
levels by 2008-2012 (the so-called first commitment period). The Protocol does not impose binding 
emission targets on developing countries signatories1. Despite persistent refusal by the USA (and until 
recently also by Australia) to ratify it, the Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005. 
 
These observations lead to the identification of at least two important shortcomings of the Kyoto 
agreement2. First, the global emission reduction achieved by the Kyoto Protocol will be very limited3. 
Second, this global emission reduction will not be produced in a cost efficient manner due to two 
reasons. First, the number of countries participating is limited meaning that many low-cost abatement 
options in developing countries will not be fully exploited4. Secondly, a number of studies have 
concluded that Russia, and other former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries, will become 
large sellers of permits, see: Criqui et al. (1999), Weyant and Hill (1999), Weyant (1999) and Sager 
(2003). Böhringer (2002) concludes that the Former Soviet Union can significantly increase its benefit 
of the Kyoto agreement by exploiting its market power in the permit market, which implies that 
marginal abatement cost are not equalized across the participating countries. In this paper, we address 
this second shortcoming of the Kyoto protocol. 
 
                                                     
1 The explanations for the Kyoto protocol’s inability to deter free-riding is inter alia given in Barret (1999). 
2 Another important shortcoming is the lack of incentives for investment in R&D. This problem is inter alia addressed in 
Golombek and Hoel (2006).  
3 The share of the ratifying Annex-B countries in global emissions is projected to decrease to about one third by 2012 
because of fast growth of emissions in non-Annex-B countries. The poor global emission reduction achieved by the Kyoto 
Protocol is, inter alia, discussed in Böhringer (2002), Hagem and Holtsmark (2001), den Elzen and de Moor (2002a) and 
Eyckmans, Van Regemorter and van Steenberghe (2005). 
4 According to the Kyoto protocol, industrialized countries with quantified emission target are allowed to meet part of their 
reduction commitment through investments in emission reducing projects in developing countries (the Clean Development 
Mechanism CDM). However, the CDM is a project–based mechanism that cannot ensure that all low cost options can be 
exploited as there are several abatement options that cannot be attributed to any specific investment project (for instance in 
the transport sector). See http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php for guidelines to validation of CDM-
projects.  
4 
In November-December 2007, the international negotiators at the 13th Conference of the Parties (CoP) 
of the UNFCCC in Bali have agreed upon a roadmap for negotiations that should lead to a new climate 
agreement for the post-Kyoto period, i.e. 2013 and beyond. However, no consensus has been reached 
yet on the group of signatories, the global future emission target, let alone the regional burden sharing. 
Therefore, we are forced to make assumptions on the provisions of a possible follow-up climate 
agreement. In particular, we assume that the same group of countries that accepted binding emissions 
ceilings in the Kyoto Protocol will continue to do so in the post-Kyoto period and we focus on 
possible expansions of this group. Because of the relatively poor global emission reduction achieved 
by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol for the first commitment period, we find it reasonable to assume that a 
future climate agreement will specify more stringent emission targets for its ratifiers. In particular, we 
assume an emission target for the ratifying countries that is 20% below 1990 emissions levels5.  
 
Concerning market power, we assume that also in the post-Kyoto period, there is at least one (group 
of) large permit seller(s) that behaves strategically, i.e. that withholds some supply out of the market in 
order to drive up the permit price and their permit trading profits. Our analysis will focus on the 
possible strategies of the European Union EU as a group of net buyers of permits, but firms in each 
individual EU country are assumed to act as competitive price taking agents in the permit market6.  
 
Furthermore, we assume that developing countries are invited to join the treaty7. If they join, they 
receive an allocation of permits, and are allowed to trade on the permit market on equal terms as the 
developing countries. A sufficiently large allocation of permits to the developing countries ensures 
that their benefit of joining is non-negative. These assumptions are not crucial for our theoretical 
analysis but do, of course, affect the final numbers in our simulation exercise. 
 
There is a large literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEA) and the stability of such 
agreements see, e.g. Barrett (1999) and Chander and Tulkens (1995) or Finus (2003). The stability of 
                                                     
5 Minus 20% is in line with the proposal made by the EU after the 2007 Spring meeting of Ministers of Environment, for a 
new international climate agreement for the post-Kyoto period. 
6 The EU has designed its own emission trading scheme, and it is thus at the time being not obvious that there will be trade in 
emission permits across countries participating and non-participating in EU’s trading scheme. However, the starting point for 
this paper is that all permits assigned by the Protocol are fully tradable and accepted by all countries. Since the number of 
participants for the first Kyoto period (2008-2012) is decided, we find our study relevant for the period after 2012. 
Restriction on EU member states’ opportunity to purchase permits from Russia, or other countries with low abatement cost, 
increases the cost of implementing the agreement. We assume that if the Kyoto agreement continues after 2012, EU does not 
deny the member states to meet their obligations by permits purchased from other countries participating in the agreement.  
7We ignore the possibility for the use of the CDM for the post-Kyoto period. Due to possible high transaction costs, and 
problems connected with estimating real emission reduction, the CDM mechanism has met much criticism, See, among 
others, Bohm (2002), Fischer (2005) and Repetto (2001). Ignoring CDM does not affect the qualitative results of our paper, 
but affects the quantitative results, as the CDM mechanism reduces the equilibrium permit price. 
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an IEA is not the prime focus of this paper. We assume that signatories to the Kyoto protocol also 
participate in the post-Kyoto agreement. However, we assume that if any developing country chooses 
to join the treaty, they cannot be worse off than by not participating. The focus of this paper is on 
market power in the permit market and the subsequent distribution of compliance costs across 
agreement members, and not on the environmental benefit of the agreement. We therefore simplify the 
analysis by assuming that developing countries choosing to join the agreement are allocated an amount 
of emissions permits equal to their business-as-usual emissions. Because of this assumption, we can 
ignore environmental benefits of an enlargement of the climate agreement, as global emissions are 
unaffected by increased participation. Furthermore, it ensures that participation cannot decrease the 
developing countries’ welfare, compared to not participating.  
 
Broader participation would benefit the EU countries for two reasons. First, the developing countries 
(assumed to have low-cost abatement options) become net sellers of permits causing a decrease in the 
international permit price. Second, the entrance of large sellers on the market reduces the market 
power of the incumbent strategic sellers (annex B-countries like Russia and Ukraine), lowering the 
market price of permits even further. In addition to this obvious beneficial effect of developing 
countries’ participation, we show that the EU can benefit substantially from making appropriately 
designed bilateral agreements with developing countries. Such bilateral agreements should specify a 
minimum amount of permits that the developing countries should sell in the market and it enables the 
EU to act strategically on behalf of its member states. The bilateral agreements can therefore be 
interpreted as a way for the EU to exercise market power. Similar ideas where put forward by 
Ellerman and Wing (1999) in the framework of the supplementarity discussion in the aftermath of the 
signing of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the section 2 we derive the allocation of emissions and 
abatement cost across countries before possible participation by developing countries. We first 
characterize emission behavior by price taking market participants (section 2.1) and then turn to non-
competitive market behavior (section 2.2). In section 3, we consider the outcome of the permit market 
in the case of participation from a large developing country. The outcome of the permit market in the 
case where EU makes a bilateral agreement with the large developing country is analyzed in section 4. 
A numerical illustration of our model is given in section 5. Section 6 summarizes our main findings. 
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2. Permit market without participation from developing countries 
Let N {1,2, ,n}= …  denote the set of all countries in the World and { }K 1,2, ,k N= ⊆…  the subgroup 
of countries participating in a post-Kyoto climate agreement. Let BAUi ie 0,e⎡ ⎤∈⎣ ⎦  denote emissions from 
an individual country i and let Kε  denote the constraint on total emissions from all countries 
participating in the post-Kyoto agreement. The total emissions constraint for the agreement members 
is therefore given by: 
(1) i K
i K
e
∈
≤ ε∑  
A system of tradable emissions permits is implemented among the members of the agreement and 
permits are grandfathered, i.e. given for free to the participants. Let ( )1 2 k, , ,ε ε ε…  denote the 
distribution of emission permits which should satisfy the group’s total emissions constraint: 
(2) i K
i K∈
ε = ε∑  
We assume that members of the post-Kyoto climate agreement choose their emissions level in order to 
maximize net benefits of emissions: 
(3) ( ) [ ]i i i i iW B e p e i K= + ⋅ ε − ∈  
where ( )i iB e  denotes the benefits of emissions function and p is the market price of emissions 
permits. We assume that the benefits functions are increasing and strictly concave: i iB 0, B 0′ ′′≥ < . In 
the absence of climate policies, countries would emit up to their so-called business–as–usual emission 
level BAUie  which is defined as the level of emissions satisfying ( )BAUi iB e 0′ = , i.e. the welfare 
maximizing emissions level if permits were free. Countries that are not a member of the post-Kyoto 
climate agreement are assumed to emit their business–as–usual amount of emissions since they face no 
price for carbon. 
2.1. Competitive market participants 
We assume that there is a nonempty subset of agreement members that behave as price takers in the 
permit market. This subset of countries will be called the competitive fringe and is denoted by F K⊆ . 
Every fringe member takes the price of permits as given and chooses its emissions level in order to 
maximize individual benefits: 
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(4) ( ) [ ]
f
f f f f fe
max W B e p e f F= + ⋅ ε − ∀ ∈  
The solution of this maximization exercise gives rise to the following first-order conditions: 
(5) ( )f fB e p f F′ = ∀ ∈  
For every price taking member of the fringe, the first-order condition (5) defines an implicit emissions 
function: 
(6) ( )1 ff f
f
de 1e B p , 0, f F
dp B
−′= = < ∀ ∈′′  
Aggregating these emissions functions over all fringe members and inverting, yields a downward 
sloping, inverse aggregate emissions permit demand function for the fringe: 
(7) ( )F f
f F
p p e , p B 0
∈
′ ′′= = <∑  
2.2. Noncompetitive market participants 
However, for large players in the permit market, the assumption of price taking behavior is hard to 
maintain. The group of strategic permit traders is denoted by S K⊆  and together with the fringe, these 
two subsets are forming a partition of the set of post-Kyoto climate agreement members: F S K∪ =  
and F S∩ =∅ . The total emission constraint (2), can now be rewritten as:  
(8) f s F S K
f F s S
e e e e
∈ ∈
+ ≡ + ≤ ε∑ ∑  
We assume that the strategic choice variable of the noncompetitive agent(s) is (are) emissions 
quantities. Hence, we are assuming Cournot competition if there is more than one large 
noncompetitive permit trader.  
 
The maximization problem of a large strategic permit trader s is given by: 
(9) ( ) ( ) [ ]
s
s s s F s se
max W B e p e e= + ⋅ ε −  
subject to (7) and (8). 
 
The first-order condition for this maximization problem is given by: 
(10) [ ]s s sB p p e s S′ ′= + ⋅ ε − ∀ ∈  
And the corresponding second-order condition for a maximum is: 
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(11) [ ]s s sB 2 p p e 0′′ ′ ′′+ ⋅ + ⋅ ε − <  
We assume in the following that the second-order condition is always satisfied. Furthermore, to ensure 
the existence of a unique stable equilibrium, we assume throughout the paper, that the aggregate 
reaction function is downward sloping with an absolute value less than unity8.  
 
The first-order condition in (10), shows the standard result that dominant sellers supply too few 
permits (hence emit too much) in order to drive up the market price. Dominant sellers’ marginal 
benefits of emissions are therefore lower than marginal benefit of emissions in the fringe, and 
emissions are not cost effectively distributed across countries9: 
(12) s f s sB B p s S for which e′ ′< = ∀ ∈ ε >  
3. Permit market with participation from a developing country 
In this section, we consider the case where developing countries can voluntarily join the Kyoto 
agreement (opt-in) under the condition that they accept binding emission constraints. We assume that 
a developing country that opts in is given an allocation of tradable permits equal to its business–as–
usual emissions. Furthermore, we restrict our attention to one large developing country with low cost 
abatement options. China is a relevant example of a large developing country which has low cost 
abatement options and may gain a lot from participating in the agreement (provided that the allocation 
of permits is a generous as we assume here). We refer to this country as c (for China). 
 
The developing country’s endowment of permits is given by:  
(13) BAUc ceε =  
Hence, the total emission constraint of the expanded climate agreement becomes:  
(14) S F c K c Ke e e
++ + = ε + ε ≡ ε  
China has many low cost abatement options, and an initial endowment of permits corresponding to 
China’s business–as–usual emissions makes China a large seller of permits. It is therefore reasonable 
to assume that also China seeks to exploit its market power in the permit market. The group of 
                                                     
8 That is (in general), j r
j S, j s
1 e e 0 s S
∈ ≠
− < ∂ ∂ < ∀ ∈∑ . 
9 A similar, but reverse, argument applies to dominant permit buyers who have an interest in limiting their demand for 
permits in order to drive down the market price. 
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strategic Cournot players is therefore expanded by China. Welfare maximization gives the following 
first-order conditions for each of the original strategic permit traders and China;  
(15) [ ]( ) [ ]s s K S c s sB (e ) p e e p e s S+′ ′= ε − + + ⋅ ε − ∀ ∈  
(16) [ ]( ) [ ]c c K S c c cB (e ) p e e p e+′ ′= ε − + + ⋅ ε −  
China’s participation increases the supply of permits and reduces the equilibrium permit price. This 
implies that that the buyers of permits are better off than without participation from China. The EU 
countries are typical examples of net buyers of permits and therefore benefit from China’s 
participation. In the next section we will focus on the EU countries and show how they can benefit 
even more if they make a bilateral agreement with China before it enters into the post-Kyoto climate 
agreement.  
4. Bilateral agreement between China and EU 
Throughout the paper we assume that the EU cannot force it member state to act strategically on the 
permit market when purchasing permits. However, we assume that the EU Commission acts on behalf 
of the EU member states and starts bilateral negotiations with China before it enters into the permit 
market. These negotiations can be modeled as a two stage game. In the first stage, the regulator 
designs a contract it offers to China on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In the second stage emission permits 
are traded and the equilibrium price and sales are determined by the market taking into account 
Cournot behavior of the dominant suppliers. We assume that in the first stage, all agents have perfect 
foresight about the equilibrium solution in the second stage. To explore this contract it is necessary to 
split the fringe countries’ set F into two parts: EU members and non EU members:  
(17) F eu RFe e e= +  
where subscript eu refers to the EU countries taken together and subscript RF refers to the rest of the 
fringe countries. Figure 1 shows how the set of all countries N in the World is partitioned into 
agreement members K and non-members N\K, how K is partitioned into the fringe F and strategic 
players S, and how F is partitioned into eu and rest of the fringe RF.  
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Figure 1: Partitioning the set of countries 
K
F
SN
N\K
eu
RF
 
 
In terms of permit allocation, it should hold that: 
(18) F eu RFε = ε + ε  
EU can offer China a contract that specifies a fixed transfer (T) plus a minimum sales constraint. This 
corresponds to a contract which specifies a fixed monetary transfer and a maximum amount of 
emissions in China in the second stage. Hence China faces the following emission constraint in stage 
two: 
(19) c ce e≤  
where ce  denotes the maximum emission level in China specified in the bilateral contract. We assume 
in the following that China’s emission constraint is binding such that emissions from China in stage 
two equals ce
10.  
 
In order for China to accept this contract, it must be at least as well off with the contract as without. 
China’s participation constraint is given by: 
(20) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )* * * *c c c c c c c c c c c c cW e ,T B e p e T W e , B e p e⎡ ⎤= + ⋅ ε − + ≥ ε = + ⋅ ε −⎣ ⎦  
where *ce  is China’s optimal emission level in the case of no bilateral contract (i.e. the case where the 
equilibrium permit trade is characterized by (15) and (16)). Since financial transfers are costly for the 
EU, it will ensures that (20) is satisfied with equality, and this implies that the transfer T is a function 
of the emission restriction specified in the contract. Let cT(e ) denote the financial transfer which 
ensures that (20) is satisfied with equality, that is;  
                                                     
10 ce is given by (16) if China’s emission constraint is not binding. 
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(21) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]* * *c c c c c c c c cT e B e p e B e p e⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + ⋅ ε − − + ⋅ ε −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ . 
The other large strategic traders’ optimizing problem in stage two is given by:  
(22) [ ]( ) [ ]
s
s s s K S c s s
e
max W B (e ) p e e e s S+= + ε − + ⋅ ε − ∀ ∈  
and the corresponding first-order condition is given by: 
(23) [ ]( ) [ ]s K S c s sB p e e p e s S+′ ′= ε − + + ⋅ ε − ∀ ∈  
leading to the optimal emission levels s ce (e ) . The second-order conditions 
s s sB (e ) 2p p ( e ) 0′′ ′ ′′+ + ⋅ ε − <  are assumed to be always satisfied. 
 
We can now turn to analyzing the first stage of the game in which the EU optimizes the contract 
variable it offers to China: 
(24) ( ) ( ) [ ]
c
eu eu eu F eu eu ce
Max W B e p e e T(e )= + ⋅ ε − −  
subject to (7), (14), (17), (18), (21), and where cse (e )  can be found from (23). 
 
Inserting from the first order condition for the fringe, given by (5), we can write the first order 
condition of EU’s optimization problem as:11 
(25) ( )F eu eu c
c c
e Tp e e
e e
∂ ∂′ ⋅ ⋅ ⎡ε − ⎤ = −⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ . 
The right hand side of (25) equals the regulator’s cost of demanding one unit larger sale of permits 
from China. The left hand side of (25) equals the regulator’s marginal benefit of the lower permit 
price, following from one unit higher permit sale from China. 
 
We show in appendix A that (25) can be written as 
(26) [ ]S c eu eu c c
c
ep 1 [e e ] p B
e
⎡ ⎤∂′ ′− ⋅ + ⋅ ε + ε − + = −⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦
. 
From (26), we derive the following proposition: 
 
                                                     
11 See appendix A for the derivation of (26).  
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Proposition 1 
The optimal contract for EU is characterized by eu cp B B′ ′= <  if EU and China jointly becomes net 
buyers of permits, and is characterized by eu cp B B′ ′= >  if they jointly become net sellers of permits. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: See appendix B 
 
Proposition 2 
The optimal bilateral contract between EU and China leads to higher supply of permits from China 
and a lower equilibrium permit price, than without a bilateral contract. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: See appendix B 
 
EU cannot force its member states to act strategically on the permit market when purchasing permits 
in the second stage. However, EU may act strategically trough negotiations with China in the first 
stage. Demanding a larger permit sale from China than what is optimal for China (given no bilateral 
contract), drives the permit price down, which benefits EU member states. However, driving down the 
permit price has a cost as China has to be compensated for its restriction in permit sale. EU faces a 
trade off between increased permit sale, hence lower equilibrium permit price, and the financial 
transfer to China in order to satisfy China’s participation constraint. As long as net demand for permits 
from the EU countries is higher than the supply of permits from China, it is optimal for EU to 
manipulate the permit price by increasing permit sale from China such that marginal benefit of 
emissions in China is higher than the permit price. Hence, EU acts as a strategic buyer of permits. On 
the other hand, if net permit purchase from EU is lower than the permit sale from China, EU act as a 
strategic seller of permits and determine the permit sale from China such that marginal benefit from 
emission in China is lower than the permit price. However, although EU may manipulate the permit 
price such that the equilibrium price becomes higher than in case of a competitive supply of permits 
from China (characterized by cp B′= ), the bilateral contract leads to a increase in permit sale and a 
fall in the permit price compared to no bilateral contract. There are two reasons for this.  
 
First, the bilateral contract makes China a Stackelberg leader in the output market. This effect ceteris 
paribus increases the total supply of permits. Second, for any given amount of permit sale from China, 
the net supply of permits from EU and China jointly is lower, as the EU countries are net buyers. This 
increases the marginal revenue of permit sale and leads to a larger equilibrium permit sale from China. 
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The optimal contract leaves EU member states better off than without, and China equally well off with 
the contract as without. China faces a minimum sale restriction, but is compensated by a financial 
transfer. Russia is worse off under the bilateral contract between EU and China since the contract 
leads to larger supply of permits from China.  
 
Since the regulator cannot determine the permit trade from EU countries, marginal benefit of emission 
differ between China and EU countries. This implies that the emission reductions in the China/EU 
coalition are not distributed in a cost effective way. Hence, there would be room for further cost 
reductions if the EU also could determine the emission reductions among EU countries. However, that 
is assumed not to be an option for the EU regulator.  
5. Numerical illustration 
5.1. Description simulation model 
In this section we describe the numerical simulation exercise illustrating the theoretical results that 
were derived in the previous sections. The exercise is based on a stylized numerical simulation model 
of the major players in the Kyoto carbon emission permit market. Each participant in the Kyoto carbon 
permit market is characterized by a marginal carbon emission benefit function with the following 
functional form: 
(27) ( ) ii i i iBAU
i
eB e ln with 0
e
⎛ ⎞′ = γ γ <⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
The benefit function is concave in emissions since ( ) BAUii i i
i
eB e 0
e
′′ = γ < . Note that marginal benefits 
are zero when emissions equal their BAU level ( ( )BAUi iB e 0′ = ) and that marginal benefits tend to 
infinity when emissions are approaching zero ( ( )
ie 0 i i
lim B e→ ′ = +∞ ).  
 
The marginal benefit of emission functions can be reinterpreted as the marginal cost of cutting back 
emissions by one more percent by defining a new variable BAUi i ir 1 e e≡ −  as the emission reduction 
relative to business–as–usual (BAU) emissions: 
(28) ( ) ( ) ( )ii i i i i i iBAU
i
eC r ln 1 r ln B e
e
⎛ ⎞′ ′≡ γ − = γ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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Hence, marginal benefit of emissions functions are the mirror images of marginal cost of abatement 
functions. This is important for our purposes because it implies that we can easily calculate the 
parameter iγ  of the marginal benefit functions from estimates of marginal emission reduction costs 
derived from, for instance, simulations with large scale general equilibrium models.  
 
For every region in our model, the individual benefit maximization exercise can therefore be written 
as: 
(29) [ ] [ ]
BAU
i i
i i
i i i i iBAU BAU
i i0 e e
e emax B p e ln p e
e e≤ ≤
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ ⋅ ε − = γ + ⋅ ε −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
where, as before, p denotes the international market price for carbon permits and iε  the initial 
assignment of permits of player i. 
 
For the price taking players of the competitive fringe, the first-order condition for an interior solution 
to the benefit maximization exercise can be used to derive the following relationship between emission 
levels and permit price: 
(30) 
f
f BAU
f
BAU
f f
f
BAU
F F f
f F f F f
ep ln f F
e
pe e exp f F
pe e e exp
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞= γ ⋅ ∀ ∈⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⇒ = ⋅ ∀ ∈⎜ ⎟γ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⇒ ≡ = ⋅ ⎜ ⎟γ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
 
The latter expression can be interpreted as the aggregate demand for carbon emissions function of the 
price taking fringe countries. For p = 0, no emission reduction is performed and actual emissions 
coincide with BAU emissions. If the price of emission permits tends towards infinity, emissions tend 
to zero. Aggregate demand for emissions of all fringe countries together depends negatively on the 
price of permits since: 
(31) 
1BAU
f
f FF f f
edp pp exp 0
de
−
∈
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞′ = = ⋅ <⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟γ γ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑  
For the noncompetitive players in the model, we can write the following first order condition for an 
interior solution to their benefit maximization exercise:  
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(32) [ ]ss s sBAU
s
eB p p e s S
e
⎛ ⎞′ ′= + ⋅ ε − ∀ ∈⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
However, interior solutions are not guaranteed in general for this maximization problem.12 Therefore, 
we make use of a generic algorithm to compute Cournot-Nash equilibria in the oligopoly model with 
competitive fringe. In every iteration step, the algorithm sequentially considers every noncompetitive 
player and chooses an emission strategy that maximizes — subject to the fringe’s behavior 
summarized by expression (31) and the overall post-Kyoto emission ceiling — its net benefits while 
keeping fixed the emission strategies of the other noncompetitive players. This procedures is repeated 
until the Euclidian distance between the nonfringe’s emission vectors of two consecutive iterations is 
smaller than a given tolerance level.  
 
In order to calculate the optimal bilateral contract variables for the EU to offer to China, a separate 
welfare optimization problem is solved for EU, taken as given the relevant first-order conditions for F 
and S and the participation constraint for China.  
5.2. Regions and Data 
Table 1 describes the regional aggregation used in the simulation model. Only countries that accepted 
quantified emission reductions according to Annex-B of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Annex- B 
countries) are included plus China. The choice of aggregation of these countries into regions was 
motivated more by arguments of similarity in economic development and emission efficiency of 
production than by political considerations.  
 
                                                     
12 In particular, nonfringe countries with “hot air”, i.e. countries for which BAUr reε > , might be tempted not to 
reduce their emission and even to withhold some of their hot air permits in order to drive up the sales price.  
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Table 1: Regional aggregation 
EU15 Europe Union 15 
members 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK 
EEU Eastern Europe Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia 
OEU Other Europe Iceland, Malta, Norway and Switzerland 
RUS Russia  
UKR Ukraine  
CAN Canada  
JAP Japan  
AUS Australia  
NZL New Zealand  
CHN China*  
USA United States of 
America** 
 
ROW Rest of the World***  
*     China is not an Annex-B country.  
**   We excluded USA because they did not ratify the Protocol.  
*** Belarus, Kazachstan and Turkey are not included because their status in the Kyoto Protocol remains unclear. 
 
Table 2 shows the basic data input for the model which consists of estimates of the cost function 
parameter and projected BAU emissions in the future. The projections were constructed using the 
aggregate growth rates in the United States Department of Energy (DoE) International Energy Outlook 
(IEO) 2005 (reference case, see http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/ieo05/) and detailed data of 
individual countries GDP (purchasing power parity) and emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel 
use taken from the World Resources Institute (WRI) Climate Analysis Indicator Tool (CAIT) (see 
http://cait.wri.org/). The cost parameters were estimated on a set of simulation runs with the GEM-E3 
World general equilibrium model (see http://www.gem-e3.net for more detailed information)13. 
 
                                                     
13 We are grateful to Denise Van Regemorter (Center for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven) for 
providing us with the necessary cost data to estimate the cost functions. 
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Table 2: Data input 
 E1990 AAU% AAU E2015 gE hot Y2015 gY γ
EU15 4,085 74.9 3,060 4,261 0.17 – 12,987 2.30 -258 
CEU 1,281 75.9 973 1,197 -0.27 – 1,732 3.00 -96 
OEU 104 80.5 84 115 0.40 – 516 2.30 -448 
RUS 2,916 84.0 2,449 2,475 -0.65 – 1,906 3.70 -65 
UKR 926 81.1 751 675 -1.26 11.31 442 4.90 -65 
JAP 1,212 79.1 959 1,418 0.63 – 3,822 1.10 -253 
CAN 649 84.2 546 964 1.60 – 1,176 2.30 -188 
AUS 416 88.3 367 632 1.69 – 764 2.90 -200 
NZL 65 112.3 73 95 1.50 – 118 2.90 -200 
CHN 3,993 274.4 10,956 10,956 4.12 – 13,623 6.50 -126 
USA 5,573 146.5 8,167 8,167 1.54 – 14,497 2.90 -136 
ROW 17,048 204.6 34,881 34,881 2.90 – 25,965 5.30 -153 
KYOTO 11,654 79.48 9,263 11,831 0.06 – 23,463 2.31 – 
TOTAL 38,268 165,33 63, 267 65,836 2.19 – 77,547 3.99 – 
E1990: emissions 1990 of all 6 greenhouse gases CO2, CH4, N2O, PFCs, HFCs, SF6 including land use changes 
in million tonnes of CO2 equivalent; AAU%: assigned amount units in % of 1990 emissions computed taking 
into account the Bonn-Marrakesh agreements (using den Elzen and Both 2002) and 20% additional reduction; 
AAU: assigned amount units in million tonnes of CO2 equivalent; E2015: projected emissions 2015 in million 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent; gE: average annual growth rate emissions between 1990 and 2015 in %; hot air: 
difference between AAU and E2015 (only for regions for which AAU≥E2015) as % of E2015; Y2015: 
projected GDP 2015 in billion US$2000; gY: average annual growth rate GDP between 2003 and 2015 in %; γ : 
parameter marginal benefit of emission function. 
 
E1990 was constructed from WRI-CAIT database and includes all six greenhouse gases covered by 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol including emissions from land use changes. AAU and AAU% were 
computed by combining E1990 with the individual commitments in Annex-B of the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol and taking into account the Bonn-Marrakesh agreements (as in den Elzen and Both 2002) 
plus and additional reduction of 20%. Hence, we assume that emission targets for the second 
commitment period 2013-2017 is 20 % lower than during the first commitment period. Notice that for 
this assumption; only Ukraine has some limited amount of “hot air”14. E2015, gE, Y2015 and gY were 
constructed using DoE IEO 2007 projections. The parameter iγ  was estimated with OLS on a dataset 
of simulation results from the GEM-E3 World model. All emission data are expressed in million 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent and all GDP values are expressed in billion US$ of 2000.  
                                                     
14 See footnote 12 for a definition of “hot air”. 
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5.3. Results 
In this section we compare the outcome for the following four scenarios: 
1. Reference scenario. China does not participate. Competitive permit market. 
2. China does not participate. Noncompetitive permit market.  
3. China participates. Noncompetitive permit market. 
4. China participates. Noncompetitive permit market. Bilateral agreement between China and EU. 
 
Detailed tables of the outcomes of the different scenarios are given in appendix C. Table 3 summarizes 
permit prices and total compliance costs for the EU (= EU15 + EEU), the strategic permit sellers 
(Russia and Ukraine) and China, the rest of Annex-B countries, and the total cost in the four different 
scenarios. 
 
Table 3:  Price (US$/tonne CO2) and compliance cost (mill. US$) comparison between the four 
scenarios 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price 33 41 28 20 
EU (=EU15+EEU) 32,338 36,234 29,421 24,901 
Russia+Ukraine -24,218 -31,032 -15,721 -8,591 
China - - -17,491 -17,491 
Rest Annex-B 31,903 37,718 28,237 21,308 
Total 40,022 42,919 24,447 20,126 
 
We observe, by comparing scenarios 1 and 2, the impact of non-competitive behavior by Russia and 
Ukraine in a situation without participation from China. As a result of their non-competitive behavior, 
Russia and Ukraine manage to drive up the equilibrium permit price to 41$ instead of 33$ per tonne of 
CO2 in the competitive reference scenario (+25%). This raises the compliance costs for the EU 
member states (= EU15 + EEU) to 36,234 compared to 32,338 million US$ (+12%). Total compliance 
costs for the Kyoto group as a whole are raised by 7% (40,022 to 42,919 million US$). Together, 
Russia and Ukraine can raise their net result from trading from 24,218 to 31,032 million US$ (+28%) 
by behaving strategically instead of competitively.  
 
If China opts in, there are three oligopolistic emission permit suppliers competing à la Cournot besides 
the competitive fringe (scenario 3). This would reduce the permit price from 41$ to 28$ per tonne of 
CO2 and reduce compliance costs for the EU member states by 19% (compared to scenario 2). For the 
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permit sellers Russia and Ukraine, the opt in of China reduces their joint permit sales revenues from 
31,032 - 15,721 = 15,311 million US$, i.e. a decrease by about 50%. 
 
In column (4) we report results for the minimal sales contract between EU and China. Comparing 
Table 5 and Table 6 (see Appendix C), we see that the minimal sales contract requires China to sell 
about 11.83% of its BAU emissions in 2015 whereas it would sell only 6.63% if it were not 
constrained by the contract. The financial transfer required to keep China equally well off (China’s 
total net benefit of emissions trading amount to 17,491 million US$, both in scenario (3) and (4)) 
values about 1,720 million US$. This absolute number might seem high but it amounts to only about 
0.01% of EUs projected GDP in 2015. Note that instead of transferring money, the EU could equally 
well transfer an amount of emissions permits equal to about 3% of EUs initial permit allocation. The 
market value of those permits corresponds to the required financial transfer. Note that this is the 
transfer mechanism that used to calculate the numbers reported in Table 6 in Appendix C. EUs AAUs 
are down by about 3% whereas China’s AAU are up by 0.77% compared to all other scenarios. 
Overall, EU and China together are allocated the same amount of CO2 emissions permits all the 
scenarios. 
 
By making a bilateral contract with China, EU is able to reduce its member states compliance cost 
strongly. The contract (minimal sales condition) solution yields compliance costs for the EU of about 
24,901 million US$ versus 29,421 million US$ in the scenario that China opts in and behaves non-
competitively. Compared to the scenario without China opting in and Russia and Ukraine behaving 
noncompetitively, the EU saves even 31% in compliance costs when comparing to (from 36,234 in 
scenario (2) to 24,901 million US$ in scenario (4)). Furthermore, the total compliance cost of the full 
post-Kyoto agreement is reduced by 53% (from 42,919 to 20,126 million US$ $). For the permit 
sellers Russia and Ukraine, the opt-in of China combined with the minimal sales condition makes 
them lose about 31,032 - 8,591 = 23,545 million US$, i.e. a decrease by 73% compared to the situation 
where Russia and Ukraine where the sole permit exporters in the Kyoto market. This might raise 
serious concerns about the cohesion of the original Kyoto club since it is very likely that Russia and 
Ukraine will claim compensation for the sales revenues forgone. However, they can not credibly 
threaten to quit the Kyoto club since this would yield them zero sales revenues. 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have shown how a group of net buyers of permits (the EU countries) benefits from 
broader participation in a climate treaty, given that the new entrant is a net seller of permits. We have 
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shown that an appropriately designed bilateral agreement regarding a minimum amount of permit sales 
from potential new entrants can substantially decrease the cost of the group of net permit importers. In 
the paper we considered the case where the entrant became a large seller of permits, and would 
reasonably be expected to act strategically in the permit market. This assumption, however, is not 
crucial for our conclusion. Even if the developing country did not intend to act strategically in the 
permit market, the group of net buyers would benefit from offering the country a contract which 
induces it to alter its strategy compared to the scenario without the bilateral contract. We demonstrated 
that an optimal contract leads to a situation where the marginal benefit of emissions for the developing 
country deviates from the market permit price. Finally, we noted that there is even more potential gain 
for the EU countries if they make bilateral agreements with several small price taking developing 
countries that consider to join the post-Kyoto climate agreement by inducing them to increase their 
permits sales volume.  
 
We have also assumed that at least one of the original members of the Kyoto club is a large seller of 
permits and exploit its market power in the permit market. However, neither this, nor the previous, 
assumption is crucial for our conclusion that it is profitable for EU to make a bilateral agreement with 
potential entrants. The driving force for the gain of bilateral agreements is that EU and the potential 
entrants jointly become a large trader of permits, and hence can benefit from acting strategically in the 
permit market. 
 
We showed that the entrance of a large seller of permits (China) is detrimental for the incumbent 
strategic sellers of permits (Russia and Ukraine), as the permit price falls sharply from 41$ to 28$ per 
tonne of CO2. But even though China’s participation was costly for them, they were still better off 
participating in the permit market than leaving the agreement. Finally, our computations show that by 
offering a deal to China, EU can cut its net compliance costs by more than one third, even after 
accounting for the financial transfer needed to satisfy China’s voluntary participation constraint.  
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Appendix A 
 
This appendix shows the derivation of (25) and (26). 
We see from (7), (14), (18) and (23), that F ce (e ) , eu ce (e ) and S ce (e ) , such that ( )cp e . Hence, (24) can 
be rewritten as: 
(A.1) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
c
eu eu eu c c eu eu c c
e
max W B e e p e e e T e= + ⋅ ⎡ε − ⎤ −⎣ ⎦  
where the first order condition is given by: 
(A.2) ( )eu eueu eu eu c
c c c c
e ep TB e e p 0
e e e e
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂∂ ∂′ ⋅ + ⋅ ⎡ε − ⎤ + ⋅ − − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
 
Rearranging and inserting from the first order condition for the EU countries’ trade in the permit 
market, given by (5) for f =eu, gives 
(A.3) ( )eu eu c
c c
p Te e
e e
∂ ∂⋅ ⎡ε − ⎤ =⎣ ⎦∂ ∂  
(equation (A.3) is identical to equation (25)) 
We see from total differentiation (14) that SF
c c
ee 1
e e
⎡ ⎤∂∂ = − +⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
.  
We find 
c
F
e
∂
∂ from total differentiation of (21); 
(A.4) c c c
c c
T pp B ( e )
e e
∂ ∂′= − − ε −∂ ∂  
Inserting from (A.4), we find that equation (A.3) (equation (25)) can be written as: 
(A.5) ( )eu c eu c c c
c
p e e e ) p B
e
∂ ⎡ ⎤ ′⋅ ε + ε − ⎡ + ⎤ = −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦∂  
Equation (A.3) is identical to equation (26).  
  □ 
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Appendix B 
 
Proof of proposition 1 
It follows from (5) that eup B′= . When China’s supply of permits is set in the first stage, by the 
determination of ce , the other large sellers become Stackelberg followers in the permit market in the 
second stage. By assumption, S
c
e1 0
e
∂− < <∂  (see footnote 8). If EU and China jointly are net buyers 
(sellers) of permits, cc eu eu[e e ]⎡ ⎤ε + ε − +⎣ ⎦ < 0 (>0), the left hand side of (26) is negative (positive), 
which implies that ( eu cB B′ ′− ) < 0 (>0).  
  □ 
 
Proof of proposition 2 
The first order condition for China’s emissions under the optimal bilateral contract given by (26) can 
be rearranged to  
(B.1) [ ]
S
s cS
s 1
c c K s c c c eu eu c
s 1 c
e (e )
B (e ) p e (e ) e p 1 [e e ]
e
+ =
=
⎡ ⎤∂⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤′ ′ ⎢ ⎥= ε − + + ⋅ + ⋅ ε + ε − +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑∑  
In order to prove that the supply of permits from China is larger under bilateral contract than without, 
suppose that China’s emission under both situations equals *ce , which is the emissions from China 
which satisfies (16) with equity. That implies that the emissions from the other large suppliers, s S∈ , 
also are identical under both regimes as the solution for se  from (23) equals the solution for se  from 
(15) when the emission from China is identical. However, if *ce  satisfies (16) with equity it cannot 
satisfy (B.1) with equality as 
S
s c
*s 1
c eu eu c*
c
e (e )
p 1 [e e ]
e
=
⎡ ⎤∂⎢ ⎥′ ⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤⋅ + ⋅ ε + ε − +⎣ ⎦∂⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑
> *c cp e′ ⎡ ⎤⋅ ε −⎣ ⎦  since 
S
s c
s 1
*
c
e (e )
0 1 1
e
=
⎡ ⎤∂⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥< + <∂⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑
 (see footnote 8), and eu eue 0⎡ ⎤ε − <⎣ ⎦ , as EU countries are assumed be net 
buyer of permits. 
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This implies that the left hand side is smaller than the right hand side of (B.1) for *c ce e= . Hence, it 
follows from the second order condition that the emissions from China which satisfies (B.1) must be 
larger than *ce . Furthermore since 
S
s c
s 1
c
e (e )
0 1 1
e
=
⎡ ⎤∂⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥< + <∂⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑
, total supply of permits is larger under the 
contract than without, which leads to lower equilibrium permit price.  
  □ 
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Appendix C 
 
Simulation results: 
Table 3:  Scenario 1. Reference Scenario. China does not participate. Competitive permit 
market.15 
 AAU E R EXP MAC AC TRADE TC MUP 
EU15 72.84 87.95 12.05 -16.14 33.08 8,310 22,748 31,058 – 
CEU 81.30 70.75 29.25 10.55 33.08 5,457 -4,177 1,280 – 
OEU 72.82 92.88 7.12 -20.06 33.08 134 762 896 – 
RUS 98.97 60.11 39.89 38.86 33.08 14,952 -31,818 -16,866 – 
UKR 111.31 60.11 39.89 51.20 33.08 4,076 -11,429 -7,352 – 
JAP 67.61 87.73 12.27 -20.12 33.08 2,816 9,439 12,255 – 
CAN 56.65 83.88 16.12 -27.23 33.08 2,495 8,684 11,179 – 
AUS 58.15 84.74 15.26 -26.59 33.08 1,551 5,557 7,108 – 
NZL 77.34 84.74 15.26 -7.40 33.08 233 232 465 – 
CHN 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 – 
USA 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 – 
ROW 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 – 
F 77.58 78.29 21.71 0 33.08 40,022 0 40,022 – 
S – – – – – – – – – 
KYOTO 77.58 78.29 21.71 0 33.08 40,022 0 40,022 – 
WORLD 96.10 96.10 3.90 0 4.84 40,022 0 40,022 – 
price: 33.08 $/tonne CO2 
F = {EU15, CEU, OEU, RUS, UKR, JAP,CAN, AUS, NZL} 
S = ∅ 
 
                                                     
15 AAU: assigned amount units or initial emission permit allocation as % of projected 2015 emissions; E: remaining 
emissions in 2015 as % of projected 2015 emissions; R: emissions reduction as % of projected 2015 emissions; EXP: net 
export of emissions permits (AAU-E) as % of projected 2015 emissions; MAC: marginal emission reduction cost in US$2000 
per tonne of CO2; AC: emission abatement costs in million US$2000; TRADE: market value of net emissions permits trade (-
p.EXP) in million US$2000; TC: total net cost (AC+TRADE) in million US$2000; mup: markup or difference in percent 
between MAC and price relative to price ((p-MAC)/p). 
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Table 4: Scenario 2. China does not participate. Noncompetitive permit market 
 AAU E R EXP MAC AC TRADE TC MUP 
EU15 72.84 85.14 14.86 -13.32 41.46 12,775 23,539 36,314 – 
CEU 81.30 64.81 35.19 16.49 41.46 8,100 -8,180 -80 – 
OEU 72.82 91.16 8.84 -18.34 41.46 207 873 1,080 – 
RUS 98.97 71.62 28.38 27.35 21.70 7,197 -28,066 -20,868 91.09 
UKR 111.31 61.46 38.54 49.85 31.64 3,782 -13,946 -10,164 31.04 
JAP 67.61 84.87 15.13 -17.26 41.46 4,327 10,148 14,475 – 
CAN 56.65 80.23 19.77 -23.58 41.46 3,806 9,424 13,230 – 
AUS 58.15 81.26 18.74 -23.11 41.46 2,370 6,053 8,423 – 
NZL 77.34 81.26 18.74 -3.92 41.46 356 154 510 – 
CHN 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 – 
USA 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 – 
ROW 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 – 
F 68.86 81.50 18.50 -11.67 41.46 31,940 42,011 73,951 – 
S 101.61 69.44 30.56 32.17 23.58 10,979 -42,011 -31,032 – 
KYOTO 77.58 78.29 21.71 0 37.24 42,919 0 42,919 – 
WORLD 96.10 96.10 3.90 0 5.45 42,919 0 42,919 – 
price: 41.46 $/tonne CO2 
F = {EU15, CEU, OEU, JAP,CAN, AUS,NZL} 
S = {RUS, UKR} 
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Table 5: Scenario 3. China participates. Noncompetitive permit market 
 AAU E R EXP MAC AC TRADE TC MUP 
EU15 72.84 89.58 10.42 -17.76 28.36 6,180 21,465 27,645 – 
CEU 81.30 74.33 25.67 6.97 28.36 4,140 -2,364 1,776 – 
OEU 72.82 93.86 6.14 -21.05 28.36 99 685 784 – 
RUS 98.97 79.23 20.77 19.74 15.13 3,738 -13,852 -10,114 87.41 
UKR 111.31 72.16 27.84 39.14 21.21 1,884 -7,490 -5,606 33.73 
JAP 67.61 89.39 10.61 -21.77 28.36 2,094 8,757 10,851 – 
CAN 56.65 86.02 13.98 -29.36 28.36 1,864 8,027 9,891 – 
AUS 58.15 86.77 13.23 -28.62 28.36 1,157 5,127 6,284 – 
NZL 77.34 86.77 13.23 -9.43 28.36 174 254 427 – 
CHN 100 93.37 6.63 6.63 8.68 3,118 -20,609 -17,491 226.72
USA 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 – 
ROW 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 – 
F 68.86 86.87 13.13 -17.04 28.36 15,707 41,951 57,658 – 
S 100.96 89.87 10.13 10.49 10.16 8,739 -41,951 -33,212 – 
KYOTO 88.73 88.73 11.27 0 16.95 24,447 0 24,447 – 
WORLD 96.10 96.10 3.90 0 5.42 24,447 0 24,447 – 
price: 28.36 $/tonne CO2 
F = {EU15, CEU, OEU, JAP, CAN, AUS, NZL} 
S = {RUS, UKR, CHN} 
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Table 6:  Scenario 4. China participates. Noncompetitive permit market. Bilateral agreement 
between China and EU (EU15+EEU). 
 AAU E R EXP MAC AC TRADE TC MUP 
EU15 69.83 92.43 7.57 -22.60 20.28 3,228 19,536 22,764 – 
CEU 81.30 80.88 19.12 0.42 20.28 2,238 -101 2,137 – 
OEU 72.82 95.57 4.43 -22.76 20.28 51 530 581 – 
RUS 98.97 84.44 15.56 14.53 10.99 2,057 -7,294 -5,236 84.49 
UKR 111.31 79.67 20.33 31.63 14.77 975 -4,329 -3,355 37.33 
JAP 67.61 92.29 7.71 -24.68 20.28 1,094 7,098 8,192 – 
CAN 56.65 89.79 10.21 -33.13 20.28 981 6,478 7,459 – 
AUS 58.15 90.35 9.65 -32.20 20.28 608 4,125 4,733 – 
NZL 77.34 90.35 9.65 -13.01 20.28 91 250 342 – 
CHN* 100.77 88.94 11.06 11.83 14.82 8,803 -26,294 -17,491 36.85 
USA 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 – 
ROW 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 – 
F 68.86 90.39 9.61 -21.53 20.28 8,291 37,917 46,208 – 
S 101.61 83.42 16.58 18.19 11.77 3,032 -11,623 -8,591 – 
KYOTO 77.58 88.53 11.47 -10.96 18.15 11,323 26,294 37,617 – 
WORLD 96.10 96.10 3.90 0 5.42 20,126 0 20,126 – 
price: 20.28 $/tonne CO2 
minimal sales constraint: EXP ≥  11.83% 
F = {EU15, CEU, OEU, JAP, CAN, AUS, NZL} 
S = {RUS, UKR} 
* participation constraint  
 
 
